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ABSTRACT
Electrocardiogram (ECG) is the most widely used diagnostic tool to monitor the
condition of the cardiovascular system. Deep neural networks (DNNs), have been
developed in many research labs for automatic interpretation of ECG signals to
identify potential abnormalities in patient hearts. Studies have shown that given
a sufficiently large amount of data, the classification accuracy of DNNs could
reach human-expert cardiologist level. A DNN-based automated ECG diagnos-
tic system would be an affordable solution for patients in developing countries
where human-expert cardiologist are lacking. However, despite of the excellent
performance in classification accuracy, it has been shown that DNNs are highly
vulnerable to adversarial attacks: subtle changes in input of a DNN can lead to
a wrong classification output with high confidence. Thus, it is challenging and
essential to improve adversarial robustness of DNNs for ECG signal classification
a life-critical application. In this work, we proposed to improve DNN robustness
from the perspective of noise-to-signal ratio (NSR) and developed two methods
to minimize NSR during training process. We evaluated the proposed methods on
PhysionNets MIT-BIH dataset, and the results show that our proposed methods
lead to an enhancement in robustness against PGD adversarial attack and SPSA
attack, with a minimal change in accuracy on clean data.
1 INTRODUCTION
Electrocardiogram (ECG) is widely used for monitoring the condition of cardiovascular system. Af-
ter many years of residency training, a cardiologist becomes experienced in reading ECG graphs,
detect abnormalities and classify signals into different disease categories. This is tedious and time-
consuming. Researchers found out that deep neural networks (DNNs), especially convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs) can be trained for ECG signal analysis with excellent classification accuracy
(Kachuee et al., 2018) (Hannun et al., 2019). Therefore, with a sufficiently large amount of data and
a carefully-designed network structure, DNN models could reach human expert cardiologist level
for ECG signal classification, and the analysis for a patient can be done in a fraction of a second.
For patients in developing countries where human-expert cardiologists are lacking, a DNN-based
automated ECG diagnostic system would be an affordable solution to improve health outcomes.
However, recent studies have shown that despite the high classification accuracy of DNNs, they are
susceptible to adversarial attacks in the form of small perturbations to input of the networks, and
the perturbation is even imperceptible to human eyes and not expected (by humans) to change the
prediction of DNNs (Akhtar & Mian, 2018). Adversarial attacks can be classified into two types
based on whether the whole structure of the network is known by the attacker. It is a white box
attack if the attacker knows the inner structure of the network, such as Fast Gradient Signed Method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)(Madry et al., 2017). It
is a black box attack if the attacker has almost no knowledge of the inner structure of the network,
such as transfer-based attack (Papernot et al., 2017) and SPSA (Uesato et al., 2018). These attacks
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(Akhtar & Mian, 2018) pose significant threats to the deep learning systems in sensitive and life-
critical application fields such as ECG classification.
To improve DNN robustness, lots of effort has been made by researchers to develop defense meth-
ods. Currently, the most popular defense strategy is adversarial training. The basic idea of adver-
sarial training is to added noise to the training samples and the noise is from specific adversarial
attacks (e.g. PGD). Through adversarial training, the network can learn some features of adversarial
noises and its decision boundary is modified so that it will become difficult to push the input across
the decision boundary by adding a small amount of noise. Adversarial training is straightforward
but has many problems. For example, generating adversarial samples is very time-consuming, and
low-quality adversarial samples can be misleading and even reduce the classification accuracy of
networks. Therefore, different adversarial training based defense methods were proposed (Akhtar
& Mian, 2018), which share the same basic idea and vary in how the adversarial samples are gener-
ated. Parallel to adversarial training, regularization terms can be added to loss function to reduce the
sensitivity of network output with respect to the input. The regularization terms could be the gradi-
ent magnitude of loss with respect to input (Ros & Doshi-velez, 2017), or Jacobian regularization
(Jakubovitz & Giryes, 2018).
2 METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we proposed two new loss functions with regularization terms to improve robustness
of neural networks for ECG signal classification. Our methods aim to reduce the effect of noises
added to input, from the perspective of noise-to-signal ratio (NSR), which may make the network
more robust. We evaluated our methods on PhysioNet MIT-BIH Arrhythmia ECG dataset (Moody &
Mark, 2001) (ECG). The results from our experiment show that our proposed methods can achieve a
significant improvement in network robustness against PGD white-box attack and SPSA black-box
attack, and outperforms the standard adversarial training.
2.1 ECG DATASET
The PhysioNet MIT-BIH Arrhythmia ECG Dataset contains 109446 ECG heartbeat records, and
there are 5 categories: N (Normal, Left/Right bundle branch block, Atrial escape and Nodal escape),
S (Atrial premature, Aberrant atrial premature, Nodal premature and Supra-ventricular premature),
V (Premature ventricular contraction and Ventricular escape), F (Fusion of ventricular and normal)
and Q (Paced, Fusion of paced and normal and Unclassifiable). The dataset has been divided into a
training set (87554 samples) and a testing set (21892 samples), which is publically available (ECG).
We further divided the training set into a ’pure’ training set (70043 samples, 80%) and a validation
set (17511 samples, 20%). The dataset has a large imbalance between classes, and we performed
up-sampling to ensure that there are roughly the same number of samples in each class in the training
set and testing set.
2.2 NEW LOSS FUNCTIONS TO REDUCE NOISE-TO-SIGNAL RATIO
In this section, we will introduce two new loss functions to improve network robustness by reducing
noise-to-signal ratio (NSR). The noise refers to the adversarial noise generated from an adversarial
attack. The signal refers to the output of the classification network (the logits before the softmax
layer). Our methods assume that the nonlinear activation function is ReLU or its variants, and the
network may have convolution layers, fully-connected layers, pooling layers, batch-normalization
layers, dropout layers, and skip-connections. Since a convolution layer is equivalent to a fully-
connected layer with shared weights, we can convert a CNN into a multiple layer perceptron (MLP)
in theory. Therefore, we will introduce our method using MLP only in this section. Given an input
sample x (a vector), the output of a classification network can be exactly expressed by a ”linear”
equation (Ding et al., 2018):
z =WTx+ b (1)
where the weight matrix W will be different for different x, and the bias vector b will different for
different x. The output is a vectorz = [z1, . . . , z5]
Twhere zi is the output logit of Class i and the
total number of classes is 5 in this application. Let wi be the ith column of W and bi be the ith
2
Accepted as a workshop paper at AI4AH, ICLR 2020
element of b, then we have
zi = w
T
i x+ bi (2)
The two new loss functions will be introduced in the following sub-sections using the above nota-
tions and equations.
2.2.1 LOSS1
Often, the bias terms of a DNN are very small, and they can be ignored. Therefore, equation (2) is
simplified to
zy = w
T
y x (3)
where y is the true class label of x. zy is the dot product of two vectors, wy and x. Given the
magnitude of wy , the dot product reaches the maximum when the two vectors are aligned in the
same direction. In other words, we can train a classification network such that x is ”memorized”
by wy , similar to a RBF network in some sense (deep RBF network is difficult to train (Goodfellow
et al., 2015)). Thus, we define a regularization term to encourage the alignment of the two vectors,
which is given by
R1 = ||wy − γ x
xTx
||22 (4)
where γ is a scalar coefficient of the unit vector in the direction of x. We combine the regularization
term with mean square error (MSE) loss and margin loss for classification, given by
loss1(x, y) = (zy − 1)2 +
∑
i 6=y
(zi − 0)2 +
∑
i
max(0, 1− zy + zi) + β1R1 (5)
where β1 is a scalar parameter to be determined on validation set. In this way, |zy| =
∣∣wTy x∣∣ →1.
As a result, γ can be fixed to 1. The margin loss and the regularization term R1 are only used for
correctly-classified samples; and for wrongly-classified samples, loss1 only contains MSE loss.
This new loss may improve robustness, which can be explained intuitively by Figure 3. Given a
small magnitude of adversarial noise  (a vector), to maximally change the output zy , the direction
of  should be aligned with the direction of wy . Assuming  and wy are almost in the same direction,
then  and x will be almost in the same direction because of loss1, i.e., the noise may look like the
input. Therefore, if the magnitude of  is small, it may not alter zy significantly; and if the magnitude
of  is large enough to cause miss-classification, then  becomes visually noticeable.
2.2.2 LOSS2
Here, we introduce the second loss which directly minimizes noise-to-signal (NSR) ratio. During
an adversarial attack, a noisy vector  is generated and added to the input x, and then the output
becomes
zy, = w
T
y,(x+ ) + by, (6)
If the noise  is small enough, we can assume that: wy ≈ wy, and by ≈ by,. This assumption is
valid as long as the ”on/off” states of ReLU units do not change significantly and pooling masks do
not change significantly when adversarial noise is added. Therefore,
zy, ≈ wTy x+ by + wTy  = zy + wTy  (7)
Then, we define NSR and apply Hlder’s inequality:
NSRy =
|wTy |
|zy| ≤
||wy||q.||||p
|zy| (8)
where 1p +
1
q = 1. In this work, we focus on infinite norm ||||∞ = max, and therefore
NSRy ≤ ||wy||1.max|zy| = R2 (9)
We combine the regularization term R2 with mean square error (MSE) loss and margin loss for
classification, given by
loss2(x, y) = (zy − 1)2 +
∑
i6=y
(zi − 0)2 +
∑
i
max(0, 1− zy + zi) + β2log(1 +R2) (10)
In the experiment, max is set to 1, and β2 is determined on validation set. The margin loss and
the regularization term R2 are only used for correctly-classified samples; and for wrongly-classified
samples, loss2 only contains MSE loss.
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3 EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
In the experiment, we applied the two proposed losses on two DNNs to evaluate their robustness.
One of the networks is the CNN proposed in (Kachuee et al., 2018), which has 30 layers in total.
The other network is an MLP designed by us, and it has 8 layers. The structure of this MLP is
(187-128)-RELU-(128-128)-RELU-(128-128)-RELU-(128-32)-(32-5). Based on the performance
on validation sets, we set β1 as 0.2 and set β2 as 0.5 to obtain a good balance between robustness
and accuracy. Number of epochs is 50, optimizer is ”Adamax” and learning rate is 0.001.
To study the contribution of each term in the loss functions, we also performed ablation experiment.
To obtain the baseline performance, the MLP/CNN were trained with Cross-entropy loss for 50
epochs, with ”Adamax” optimizer, and learning rate of 0.001. The two DNNs achieved good perfor-
mance in classification of ECG signals but are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, as shown in figures
from Figure 1 to Figure 2. We also evaluated the other two defense methods: (1) Jacobian regu-
larization (Jakubovitz & Giryes, 2018) and (2) standard adversarial training using 10-PGD (Shafahi
et al., 2019).
To evaluate the performance, we compare our proposed methods with other methods, which in-
cludes: MLP/CNN with Jacobian regularization (Jakubovitz & Giryes, 2018) and MLP/CNN under
10-PGD standard adversarial training (Shafahi et al., 2019) with noise 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3, where 10
is number of steps of PGD attack to generate adversarial samples. In this experiment, there are
totally 9 methods to be compared. They are: MLP/CNN with Cross-entropy loss denoted as ce in
plots, MLP/CNN with mean square error (MSE) loss denoted as mse in plots, MLP/CNN with loss1
denoted as loss1 , MLP/CNN with loss2 denoted as loss2, MLP/CNN with Jacobian regulariza-
tion denoted as jacob, MLP/CNN with MSE and margin loss denoted as mseMargin and MLP/CNN
trained with adversarial samples generated by 10-PGD adversarial attack under noise level  denoted
as adv . The loss function of this adversarial training is (Goodfellow et al., 2015):
lossadv = 0.5LCE(x, y) + 0.5LCE(x, y) (11)
where LCE is Cross-entropy loss and x is adversarial sample. Training batch size is 128 in this
experiment. Because we performed up-sampling to ensure that there are roughly the same number
of samples in each class in the testing data, average recall is the same as overall accuracy. So, we
only report overall accuracy of classification (denoted as ”ACC”) and average precision across the
five classes (denoted as ”PREC”) as metrics of performance in this experiment.
3.1 100-PGD EVALUATION
First, we used PGD adversarial attack to test these methods. Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD)(Madry et al., 2017) is regarded as the strongest first-order attack. K-PGD attacks clean
input x with K steps:
xk =
∏(
xk−1 + α · sign (∇xLoss (xk−1))) (12)
where α is the step size and xk is the adversarial example from the kth step. If the noise added
to input x is larger than the given noise level , PGD will project it back to the noise level . In
this experiment, we used 100-PGD to evaluate the methods. Figure 1 presents the results under
100-PGD attack, comparing our proposed methods to Jacobian regulation and 10-PGD adversarial
training for MLP. It can be seen that MLP with our proposed loss2 can achieve the best accuracy
and precision under all noise levels except for 0.01 (loss1 is better). Under attack on noise level 0.1,
MLP with loss2 has accuracy of 61% and precision of 64%, which is the highest among all methods.
Figure 2 presents the results under 100-PGD attack, by comparing our proposed methods to Jacobian
regulation and 10-PGD adversarial training for CNN. CNN with loss2 has the best performance.
Under the PGD attack with the noise level 0.1, CNN with loss2 can maintain an accuracy of more
than 71% and a precision of approximately 78%. In this experiment, adv0.2 and adv0.3 are not as
good as loss2 on all of the noise levels, which means these adversarially-trained CNNs are not strong
enough to resist against 100-PGD attack. The other tests can be seen in Appendix.
4 CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed two methods to improve the robustness of deep neural networks for
classification of ECG signals. Our methods aim to reduce the proportion of introduced noises in
4
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Figure 1: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for 100-PGD attack on MLP
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Figure 2: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for 100-PGD attack on CNN
the output of the neural network, namely, noise-to-signal ratio. In this way, our methods can help
reduce the effect of noise on the prediction of the network and thus improve the robustness against
adversarial attack. The results of the experiment have shown that our proposed loss2, outperforms
all other methods under white-box and black-box attacks (PDG and SPSA), for the classification
task. We hope that our approaches may faciliate the development of robust and affordable solutions
for automated ECG diagnosis for developing countries.
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A APPENDIX
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Visualization of 2-dimensional vector x and w. (a) shows the condition where w and x are
in very different direction while (b) shows the situation where w and x are in more similar direction.
B APPENDIX
In this experiment, we used 20-PGD to evaluate all methods. Figure 4 presents the results comparing
our proposed methods to Jacobian regulation and 10-PGD adversarial training for MLP under 20-
PGD attack. First, MLP with our proposed loss2 achieved the best accuracy and precision in general.
Under attack on noise level 0.1, MLP with loss2 can still have an accuracy 69% and precision 75%,
which is the highest. Second, performance of this adversarial training is not as good as loss2. We
can see that there is an intersection of adv0.1 and adv0.2 around noise level 0.1 and an intersection of
6
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adv0.2 and adv0.3 around noise level 0.2. This means that model trained from adversarial samples
under noise  only behaves well around noise level . Then, we can notice that both our proposed
losses can improve the robustness of MLP against PGD attack while keeping a high accuracy and
precision in classification of clean data. MLP with loss1 have accuracy 92% and precision 92% and
MLP with loss2 can achieve accuracy 90% and precision 92%. MLP with ce has accuracy 92% and
precision 93%, and the performance dropped quickly as noise level increased
Figure 5 presents the results comparing our proposed methods to Jacobian regulation and 10-PGD
adversarial training for CNN under 20-PGD attack. CNN with loss2 has the best performance as
well. Under the PGD attack on noise level 0.1, CNN with loss2 can still maintain an accuracy of
75% and a precision of 81%. We can see that adv0.2 outperforms loss2 around only noise level
0.2 and adv0.3, and outperforms loss2 around only noise level 0.3, while on lower noise level it
has a very weak resist to PGD attack (shown in Figure 3 (b)). This also demonstrates that model
trained with adversarial samples with noise level  only behaves well around noise level , which is
a weakness of the standard adversarial training.
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Figure 4: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for 20-PGD attack on MLP
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Figure 5: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for 20-PGD attack on CNN
C APPENDIX
We evaluated the proposed methods with a black-box attack, SPSA adversarial attack(Uesato et al.,
2018). SPSA is a gradient-free method, which is useful when the model is non-differentiable, or
more generally, the gradients do not point in useful directions. This attack is applied with almost
no knowledge of the inner structure of the network. It randomly generates samples around a given
7
Accepted as a workshop paper at AI4AH, ICLR 2020
input sample (e.g. an image) of the target network, uses these random samples to estimate the
gradient of the target network, and then the estimated gradient can be used for attacks. SPSA runs
for 100 iterations with perturbation size 0.01, Adamax learning rate 0.01, and 2048 samples for each
gradient estimation. SPSA attack is very computationally expensive, and therefore we only selected
the first 162 samples from each class for this experiment.
From Figure 6, we can see that loss2 has the best performance in general for the test of MLP. In
Figure 6 (a), jacob is the best from noise level 0.03 to noise level 0.05, slightly better than that
of loss2. However, jacob falls sharply when the noise level is larger than 0.05. When noise level
is 0.1, loss2 can still have an accuracy of about 51% while jacob method can only achieve 42%.
As the noise level becomes higher, ”jacob” drops below 10%, while loss2 is always above 20%.
In Figure6 (b), we can see that loss2 outperforms jacob method under all noise levels. So, loss2
has a better resist against SPSA black-box attack than Jacobian regularization for MLP. In Figure
6 (a), adv0.1 only outperforms loss2 on noise levels from 0.05 to 0.1, which again confirms that
model trained with adversarial samples with noise level  only behaves well around noise level . In
general, our proposed loss2 has a better performance against SPSA attack than all the other methods
in comparing.
From Figure 7, we can see that under SPSA black-box attack, loss2 has the best performance in
general. In Figure 7 (a), jacob method is outperformed by loss2. When noise level is 0.1, loss2 can
still have an accuracy of about 60%, better than jacob method that can achieve only 52%. In Figure
7 (b), we can see that loss2 outperforms jacob methods almost on all noise levels, with precision
of 74% at noise level 0.1. So, in the test on CNN, loss2 has a better resist against SPSA black-box
attack than Jacobian regularization as well. In Figure 7 (a), adv0.1 outperforms loss2 at noise level
only from 0.01 to 0.1, and adv0.2 outperforms loss2 only on noise levels from 0.1 to 0.2, which
again confirms that model trained with adversarial samples with noise level  only behaves well
around noise level . In general, our proposed loss2 has a better performance against SPSA attack
than the other methods.
The good performance of our proposed loss2, under the black-box adversarial attack, also suggests
that loss2 is not doing gradient obfuscation to improve the robustness of the target neural network.
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Figure 6: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for SPSA attack on MLP
D APPENDIX
The tables corresponding to figures from Figure 2 to Figure 7 are shown in this section.
8
Accepted as a workshop paper at AI4AH, ICLR 2020
0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
noise_level
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
AC
C
ce
jacob
mse
mseMargin
loss2
loss1
adv0.1
adv0.2
adv0.3
(a)
0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
noise_level
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
PR
EC
ce
jacob
mse
mseMargin
loss2
loss1
adv0.1
adv0.2
adv0.3
(b)
Figure 7: Test accuracy (a) and precision (b) for SPSA attack on CNN
Table 1: ACC MLP 20-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.92 0.7 0.19 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.71 0.43 0.11 0.06
mse 0.9 0.74 0.39 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.06
mseMargin 0.89 0.77 0.5 0.37 0.22 0.13 0.09
loss2 0.9 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.49 0.37
loss1 0.92 0.88 0.7 0.39 0.16 0.07 0.03
adv0.1 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.23 0.07
adv0.2 0.89 0.69 0.61 0.6 0.58 0.45 0.25
adv0.3 0.9 0.67 0.45 0.41 0.4 0.47 0.33
Table 2: PREC MLP 20-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.93 0.71 0.22 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.72 0.47 0.12 0.07
mse 0.92 0.81 0.44 0.28 0.16 0.07 0.04
mseMargin 0.92 0.84 0.64 0.45 0.25 0.14 0.08
loss2 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.75 0.56 0.43
loss1 0.92 0.89 0.73 0.45 0.2 0.12 0.07
adv0.1 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.75 0.65 0.29 0.1
adv0.2 0.91 0.72 0.64 0.63 0.6 0.48 0.29
adv0.3 0.92 0.7 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.36
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Table 3: ACC CNN 20-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.94 0.77 0.2 0.03 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.57 0.19 0.05
mse 0.92 0.73 0.36 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.02
mseMargin 0.93 0.81 0.49 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.04
loss2 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.86 0.75 0.45 0.26
loss1 0.93 0.89 0.74 0.59 0.41 0.27 0.16
adv0.1 0.91 0.9 0.86 0.83 0.7 0.13 0.03
adv0.2 0.92 0.76 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.16
adv0.3 0.93 0.83 0.37 0.21 0.35 0.48 0.52
Table 4: PREC CNN 20-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.94 0.78 0.24 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.57 0.24 0.07
mse 0.93 0.8 0.46 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.01
mseMargin 0.93 0.84 0.54 0.36 0.09 0.01 0.01
loss2 0.93 0.91 0.9 0.88 0.81 0.61 0.37
loss1 0.94 0.91 0.78 0.65 0.42 0.25 0.16
adv0.1 0.91 0.9 0.87 0.83 0.71 0.17 0.04
adv0.2 0.92 0.78 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.6 0.17
adv0.3 0.94 0.85 0.39 0.22 0.38 0.5 0.53
Table 5: ACC MLP 100-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.92 0.7 0.19 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.71 0.41 0.04 0.0
mse 0.9 0.74 0.38 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.03
mseMargin 0.89 0.77 0.49 0.32 0.15 0.04 0.01
loss2 0.9 0.85 0.82 0.78 0.61 0.37 0.29
loss1 0.92 0.88 0.69 0.36 0.1 0.01 0.0
adv0.1 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.57 0.01 0.0
adv0.2 0.89 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.09 0.01
adv0.3 0.9 0.67 0.45 0.4 0.33 0.12 0.01
Table 6: PREC MLP 100-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.93 0.71 0.21 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.72 0.45 0.06 0.0
mse 0.92 0.81 0.42 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.01
mseMargin 0.92 0.84 0.63 0.38 0.17 0.06 0.01
loss2 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.64 0.31 0.24
loss1 0.92 0.89 0.73 0.41 0.15 0.01 0.0
adv0.1 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.75 0.59 0.02 0.0
adv0.2 0.91 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.54 0.12 0.01
adv0.3 0.92 0.7 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.16 0.01
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Table 7: ACC CNN 100-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.94 0.76 0.18 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.54 0.06 0.0
mse 0.92 0.71 0.23 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
mseMargin 0.93 0.79 0.37 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.0
loss2 0.93 0.9 0.88 0.85 0.71 0.37 0.22
loss1 0.93 0.89 0.73 0.54 0.36 0.23 0.12
adv0.1 0.91 0.9 0.86 0.83 0.65 0.01 0.0
adv0.2 0.92 0.74 0.65 0.59 0.46 0.06 0.0
adv0.3 0.93 0.82 0.33 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.0
Table 8: PREC CNN 100-PGD
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.94 0.78 0.22 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.55 0.08 0.0
mse 0.93 0.78 0.31 0.08 0.01 0.0 0.0
mseMargin 0.93 0.82 0.4 0.17 0.01 0.0 0.0
loss2 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.78 0.51 0.28
loss1 0.94 0.91 0.77 0.59 0.34 0.21 0.12
adv0.1 0.91 0.9 0.87 0.83 0.66 0.01 0.0
adv0.2 0.92 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.49 0.08 0.0
adv0.3 0.94 0.84 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.0
Table 9: ACC MLP SPSA
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.93 0.67 0.17 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.85 0.82 0.76 0.69 0.42 0.04 0.0
mse 0.91 0.71 0.31 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.03
mseMargin 0.91 0.77 0.45 0.32 0.12 0.02 0.0
loss2 0.9 0.82 0.73 0.67 0.51 0.32 0.2
loss1 0.92 0.87 0.69 0.39 0.08 0.02 0.0
adv0.1 0.91 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.58 0.04 0.0
adv0.2 0.89 0.6 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.23 0.04
adv0.3 0.91 0.59 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.09
Table 10: PREC MLP SPSA
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.93 0.68 0.2 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.86 0.83 0.77 0.7 0.46 0.06 0.0
mse 0.93 0.78 0.35 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.01
mseMargin 0.93 0.84 0.54 0.38 0.19 0.02 0.01
loss2 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.56 0.3 0.19
loss1 0.92 0.88 0.72 0.44 0.08 0.03 0.01
adv0.1 0.92 0.78 0.7 0.71 0.59 0.05 0.0
adv0.2 0.91 0.62 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.27 0.06
adv0.3 0.92 0.62 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.13
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Table 11: ACC CNN SPSA
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.94 0.74 0.14 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.52 0.07 0.0
mse 0.92 0.63 0.18 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.0
mseMargin 0.92 0.75 0.31 0.09 0.01 0.0 0.0
loss2 0.93 0.89 0.81 0.77 0.58 0.22 0.15
loss1 0.93 0.9 0.72 0.52 0.31 0.16 0.05
adv0.1 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.66 0.01 0.0
adv0.2 0.92 0.73 0.63 0.6 0.6 0.28 0.03
adv0.3 0.94 0.81 0.32 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.15
Table 12: PREC CNN SPSA
noise level 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
ce 0.95 0.76 0.19 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0
jacob 0.86 0.84 0.8 0.75 0.53 0.1 0.0
mse 0.93 0.72 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.0 0.0
mseMargin 0.93 0.8 0.37 0.11 0.0 0.0 0.0
loss2 0.94 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.74 0.2 0.07
loss1 0.93 0.91 0.75 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.05
adv0.1 0.91 0.9 0.87 0.83 0.68 0.03 0.0
adv0.2 0.92 0.76 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.02
adv0.3 0.94 0.83 0.32 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.17
E APPENDIX
In this section, ECG signals with different levels of noise are shown. The attack is PGD-100 and
the target network is MLP, which has been trained with Cross-entropy loss for 50 epochs. As we
can see, when the noise level reaches 0.1 (shown in Figure 8 (f)), the ECG signal is even hardly
recognizable by human eye.
F APPENDIX
In the experiment, loss funtions loss1 and loss2 run in mini-batches. Assume there are k
classes,loss1 should be:
R1 =
∑
i
||wi − γ X
XTX
||22 (13)
We combine the regularization term R1 with mean square error (MSE) loss and margin loss for
classification, given by
loss1(X,Y ) =
∑
(Z − Y )2 +multi margin loss(Y,Z) + β1R1 (14)
loss2 should be:
R2 =
k∑
i
||wi||1.max
|zi| (15)
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We combine the regularization term R2 with mean square error (MSE) loss and margin loss for
classification, given by
loss2(X,Y ) = (Z − Y )2 +multi margin loss(Y,Z) + β2log(1 +R2) (16)
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(a) clean ECG (b) ECG on noise level 0.01
(c) ECG on noise level 0.02 (d) ECG on noise level 0.03
(e) ECG on noise level 0.05 (f) ECG on noise level 0.1
(g) ECG on noise level 0.2 (h) ECG on noise level 0.3
Figure 8: ECG signals on different noise levels
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